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Introduction 
“Winston Churchill once said: 'Politics is the ability to foretell what is going to happen 
tomorrow, next week, next month and next year. And to have the ability afterwards to 
explain why it didn't happen.' 
 
Churchill was right, we can’t predict the future. Unexpected events will always occur. 
 
But as politicians, it’s our job to lead and to chart a course. It’s our job to set goals and make 
choices that help achieve those goals. And looking at Europe and the world today, it’s clear: 
the European Union needs to make choices.  Choices about its course and its role in the years 
to come.”1 
This was the opening statement of Dutch Prime-Minister Mark Rutte on June 13th, 2018 to 
the European Parliament (EP). Central to the entire speech was the concept of ‘choices’. 
Instead of the desire to influence governance in every topic, the European Union (EU) 
should make choices about what it would embrace as its own, creating a system where the 
EU can use its unique position in the world to excel in specific areas. In other words: “Less is 
more.”2 To illustrate, Rutte presented several topics where the EU would be a benefit 
instead of a burden, with a specific emphasis on climate- and environment. Climate policies 
are, according to Rutte, “by definition a cross-border issue.”3 Changes in climate, weather or 
environment do not adhere to the borders of individual states and can therefore not be 
addressed without international cooperation. 
Climate policies and the future of European integration were both central pillars of Rutte his 
speech, and he made that decision for a reason. Both are topics which cannot be postponed 
indefinitely, and which need decisive and transparent leadership. European integration is, 
especially after Brexit, a topic in need of solutions. Climate policies share this sense of 
urgency. An increase in environmental awareness has created a movement dedicated to 
changing existing structures through the construction of a world built on sustainability and 
long-term wellbeing of both mankind and nature. There is also the fact that contemporary 
structures built on the availability of fossil-fuels cannot continue to operate indefinitely 
because known and easily accessible deposits are rapidly approaching depletion. Both 
European integration and climate policies are therefore topics which are relevant for 
societies and governments alike, potentially altering the very structures our contemporary 
lives are built upon.  
So far, climate policies and European integration have been illustrated as separate topics, 
but they can also be invoked in conjunction. As stated by Rutte, climate policies are at their 
very essence cross-border issues which require international cooperation to achieve results. 
                                                          
1 Rijksoverheid, ‘Toespraak minister-president Rutte over de toekomst van de Europese Unie - Europees 
Parlement, Straatsburg’, (13 June 2018), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/bewindspersonen/mark-
rutte/documenten?pagina=2 (03 July 2018).    
2 Idem. 
3 Idem. 
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The way this happens (or not) is a direct example of interaction between climate policies 
and European integration. This interaction can be measured through identifying the 
situation, priorities and goals of individual member-states and to compare them with why 
they voted in favour or against certain policies. Through a comparison between past 
outcomes and contemporary decisions, an analysis can be created which identifies why 
certain policies changed or stayed the same.  
To successfully perform a comparison between past- and present policymaking, theoretical 
concepts must be narrowed down to useable standards; which means that the ambiguous 
concept of ‘climate policies’ does not suffice. Within climate policies, the importance of 
energy is paramount, with a specific emphasis on the way energy is generated. Within the 
EU, energy is often generated through fossil-fuels, which have several negative 
characteristics such as limited supplies and the emission of greenhouse gasses. In an effort 
to reduce dependency on fossil-fuels, a phenomenon is taking place within the EU which 
from now on will be identified as the transition to renewable energy. Through this transition, 
fossil-fuels will be replaced with renewable sources. The EU is currently in the middle of this 
transition, with member-states trying to adjust their energy-mixes accordingly. Energy is 
already better suited for identifying differences between past and present but is 
unfortunately still too broad to effectively use. It is an overarching term which has several 
subservient fields with distinctive characteristics, sources and implications. As an example, 
energy generated for use in transportation is different than energy used to generate 
heating. Therefore, the decision has been made to narrow the topic down even more and 
focus on one subsidiary of energy, which is electricity. 
A primary reason for this decision is the strong international aspect of electricity on several 
levels. The first level is cooperation through the direct trade of necessary sources, such as 
the trade of oil or coal for electricity production. The second level is the trade of electricity 
itself, through an international grid and regional electricity markets. The third level is the 
direct role of the EU in its efforts to create an internal EU market for all member states, 
complete with the infrastructure necessary to achieve this goal. Electricity is therefore often 
an international affair, which makes it very applicable for a comparative analysis with 
European integration in the past, present and future.  
Therefore, this article has been built on the premise that a correlation between electricity 
generation and European integration exists. This correlation is changing through the 
transition to renewable energy, which is currently taking place in all 28 EU member-states. 
As old structures are making place for new ones, the central question of this article will 
therefore be how the transition to renewable sources for the generation of electricity 
influences European integration.  
This question is relevant because a gap exists in the literature about the correlation 
between international relations and renewable sources of electricity, or energy, in general. 
There are many sources describing the technical aspects of renewable energy, but a direct 
connection to international politics is a field which is often overlooked, especially within the 
unique setting of the EU. The increasing shares of renewable energy in electricity generation 
are fundamentally changing the structures upon which European energy integration is built, 
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and it is in favour of not only academics and policymakers, but society as well, that we 
understand how these changes are taking place and what the results can be.  
To be able to successfully answer the question, it is necessary to identify a theoretical 
framework to which the question can be attached. A primary reason why energy policies are 
not merely national affairs, but instead have an international dimension as well, is the 
concept of energy security. This concept, which will be further explained and analysed in the 
first chapter, will form the theoretical basis which can explain the correlation between 
electricity generation and European integration. The concept of energy security will then be 
combined with a historical analysis of three events which have defined European energy 
policies so far. This will be done to illustrate how the concept has influenced European 
policies in the past. The first event is the founding of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and its stance towards fossil-fuels, specifically coal. The second event is 
the 1973 Oil Crisis, and the consequences it had for energy throughout Europe. The third 
event is an analysis of the efforts of recent years. After past energy policies have been 
identified, contemporary alternatives to fossil-fuels which can already be deployed will be 
described and discussed, with specific attention to their inherent characteristics which 
define their applicability in Europe.  
This combination of concepts, history and renewable alternatives will form the base of a 
thorough analysis of contemporary efforts of three EU member-states. These are the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Bulgaria. The decision to not analyse the efforts of the entire EU 
simultaneously is based on the motto of the EU itself, which is “United in diversity.”4 The 
fact that each member-state is in a unique situation cannot be underestimated, and what 
policies might be applicable for one member-state might therefore be disastrous or 
irrelevant for others. These states have been chosen because they all deal with the 
transition to renewable energy in their own way. Sweden is one of the forerunners in the 
world when it comes to renewable energy, whilst the Netherlands has ambitious plans but is 
underperforming in actual deployment. Bulgaria, at the periphery of the EU, also wants to 
reach EU-goals, but has other problems of its own to handle first.  
The primary goal of this article is to create a foundation for further research about the 
connection between the transition to renewable energy and European integration. It will 
therefore be a combination of a description and an analysis, identifying past and 
contemporary energy policies and combining them. Upon this basis, future in-depth 
research can be done, focussing on other fields of energy such as transportation and heating 
or different case-studies within the EU.  
 
 
                                                          
4 Europa.eu, ‘The EU motto’, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/motto_en (03 July 2018).  
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Chapter 1: Historical Context of Energy Integration in 
Europe 
The concept of Energy Security 
To answer the question what the relationship between renewable energy and European 
integration entails, a clearly defined theoretical framework is necessary. In answering this 
particular question, the theoretical framework will be linked to the concept of energy 
security, which plays a vital role in policymaking within the EU. Before this can be illustrated 
however, it is necessary to first describe energy security itself and its potential uses. Even 
though the term is widespread in official documents and academic papers, it does not 
always hold the same meaning and context; the concept of energy security has, throughout 
the years, been used by different actors in different situations to describe different 
phenomenon. 
A solid place to start is the definition used by the International Energy Agency (IEA). It states 
that energy security is “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable 
price.”5 That being said, the IEA believes that energy security has differing dimensions 
depending on factors such as time. Long-term energy security can deal with “timely 
investments to supply energy in line with economic developments and sustainable needs”, 
whilst “short-term energy security focuses on the ability of the energy system to react 
promptly to sudden changes within the supply-demand balance.”6 What energy security 
means, according to the IEA, changes depending on the timeframe and relevant 
circumstances.  
Other actors also believe that energy security is more than a singular definition which can 
be applied at all times. Christian Winzer has analysed past usage of the concept in his article 
Conceptualizing Energy Security.7 In his article, he identifies a link between energy security 
and the position of the actor who invokes the concept. Energy security can, when 
individuals are the relevant actors, mean that society is protected from mismanagement by 
companies and states. In this case, relevant facets of the concept are price-management 
and availability for individual consumers.8  
When states invoke the concept, other factors become relevant. For states, energy security 
is about subjects such as the reliable provision of energy and the protection of the economy. 
In this case, enhancing energy security is about making sure that sources of supply are as 
stable as possible and that proper contingency plans are in place when supply fails.9  
                                                          
5 International Energy Agency, ‘What is Energy Security?’, 
https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/whatisenergysecurity/ (27 June 2018).  
6 Idem. 
7 Christian Winzer, ‘Conceptualizing energy security’, in: Energy Policy, July 2012, Vol.46, 36-48. 
8 Winzer, ‘Conceptualizing energy security’, 36. 
9 Idem. 
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Having identified the role of actors, Winzer defines energy security as an ambiguous 
concept governed by three principles: scope, source and severity.10 The actor who invokes 
the concept determines the scope. This can range from individuals to supranational bodies 
such as the EU. Source is about the risks which can potentially harm energy security, such as 
technical, human or natural risks. Severity details the magnitude and importance of topics 
relating to energy security.11 In short, Winzer does not pursue the goal to create a definition 
for the concept which fits in every situation. Instead, he focusses on identifying critical 
elements which define the concept of energy security depending on the context.  
Another academic, Benjamin Sovacool, uses comparable criteria to define what energy 
security can mean in certain situations in his article An International Assessment of Energy 
Security Performance.12 These are topical focus, scope and coverage, transparency and 
continuity. Topical focus is about the actors involved, whereas scope, coverage, 
transparency and continuity once again detail the circumstances under which a specific form 
of energy security can be considered relevant.13 Sovacool therefore also concludes that 
Energy security is relative to the situation at hand and open for multiple interpretations.  
What is also important to understand is that energy security, as a specific form of security, is 
inherently connected to the field of security studies. David Baldwin concluded that security 
is multidimensional, and that several types of security, such as economic security and social 
security, are not fundamentally different concepts from each other.14 The central idea of 
security, according to Baldwin, is that security is “a low probability of damage to acquired 
values”.15  This basis can then be specified through the application of three questions, 
security for whom, for what values and from what threats?16 When comparing the factors 
used by Sovacool, Winzer and the IEA with the questions formulated by Baldwin, it becomes 
clear that there are many similarities. Actors (who), scope (what values) and source/severity 
(what threat) essentially boil down to the same core elements. Energy security cannot exist 
in a vacuum. It will always be invoked by a specific actor to protect something from a 
specific risk, which makes energy security inherently ambiguous.  
The way the concept of energy security will be used in answering the question about 
European integration and renewable sources of electricity production will be based on the 
findings of these academics and the IEA. The concept will be connected to a specific actor, 
the values they want to protect and the risk which has the potential to harm security. With 
this understanding of energy security, it is time to apply it to three events which have 
defined European energy policies so far. 
 
                                                          
10 Ibidem, 43. 
11 Ibidem, 38. 
12 Benjamin K. Sovacool, ‘An international assessment of energy security performance’, in: Ecological 
Economics, 2013 Apr, Vol.88, 148-158. 
13 Sovacool, ‘An international assessment of energy security performance’, 149. 
14 David A. Baldwin, ‘The concept of security’, in: Review of International Studies, 1997, Vol.23(1), 23. 
15 Baldwin, ‘The concept of security’, 13. 
16 Ibidem, 13-16. 
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The European Coal and Steel Community 
The first historical case to be analysed is the European Coal and Steel Community. Central to 
the creation of this institution is Robert Schuman, who, as the French minister of foreign 
affairs, played a critical role in determining the scope and role of the ECSC through what 
would later be known as the Schuman Declaration.17 Central to the ECSC was the production 
and use of coal in post-war Europe. Not only was it one of the primary means of energy 
production at the time, West-Germany its energy mix would still rely for 85% on coal in 
1957,18 but it was also critical in maintaining and operating heavy industry which could 
potentially be used to support war-efforts.  
Schuman, in his declaration, focussed on these two issues. Not only would the creation of a 
common High Authority over the production of coal and steel make “any war between 
France and Germany not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”,19 but it would also 
be essential in bringing back economic prosperity after the devastation brought upon the 
European continent by the Second World War. Therefore, it can be argued that energy 
security is closely related to the founding of the ECSC in two ways. First, Schuman and the 
other founding-members of the ECSC believed that a European body controlling the 
production and distribution of coal would diminish the chances of another war breaking out 
within Europe. Energy security in this instance is strongly related to state-security as a 
whole. The second role of energy security is creating economic prosperity through 
cooperation in the extraction and distribution of coal.  
Even though the ECSC focussed specifically on coal, it still illustrates how energy policies and 
energy security have been central concepts of European integration since the beginning. 
This would continue to be the case when the ECSC would be incorporated into the European 
Communities (EC) in 1967 and coal was gradually replaced by oil in importance. Contrary to 
coal however, policies regarding oil remained divided.20   
The 1973 Oil Crisis 
In 1973 several Arab oil-producing states decided to artificially increase oil prices and 
gradually turn down production to put pressure on the mostly European states which had 
supported Israel during the Jom-Kippoer War. This resulted in oil shortages in Europe. Even 
though coal was broadly managed through the ECSC, other sources of energy did not have 
similar regulations. This made it difficult to deal with the crisis as a unified bloc, which 
resulted in states individually searching for temporary- and long-term solutions.  
                                                          
17 European Union, ‘The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950’, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en (10 June 2018). 
18 John S. Duffield, Fuels Paradise: seeking energy security in Europe, Japan, and the United States (Baltimore 
2015), 153. 
19 European Union, ‘The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950’, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en (10 June 2018). 
20Peter Stingelin, ‘Europe and the Oil Crisis’, in: Current History, Mar 1, 1975, Vol.68(403), 97. 
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John Vogler concludes that the reason why a common policy could not be decided upon was 
because each state had a distinct energy-mix and would thus be impacted in a unique way.21 
Any European-wide effort to regulate oil could therefore be seen as an infringement on the 
sovereign capacity of an individual state to determine its own energy policy. In the end, the 
ability to retain sovereignty was deemed more important than the creation of a common 
European policy.22  
It remained difficult to convince states to support pan-European policies after the oil crisis 
as well. Calls for an internal European market were halted in 1996 and 1998.23 This can be 
explained through the efforts made by European states after the oil crisis to strengthen 
national energy policies in order to protect their own security of supply. The United 
Kingdom (UK) started searching for new oilfields to diversify their sources and found them in 
the North Sea.24 In Germany, oil had taken over the central position of coal in the years 
before the oil crisis.25 The crisis showed the German government that reliance on oil as a 
primary source of energy brought large risks for security of supply, and the government 
therefore looked at alternatives without necessarily going back to coal. One of the potential 
alternatives was the use of nuclear energy, but it was decided that nuclear energy should 
only be developed to the extend absolutely necessary to secure energy supply.26 This 
decision ultimately made the Germans move towards investments in renewable energy 
instead.    
The oil crisis illustrated how important it is for states to safeguard their security of supply, 
and that this goal does not always go hand in hand with common European policies. When 
energy security can be maintained through national solutions, states will prefer sovereignty 
over common European solutions.  
Towards Renewables and European Policies 
Even though states remained wary of the concept of a unified energy market, the EC, and 
later the EU, never completely let go of the idea. The resistance of individual states 
gradually diminished during the first decade of the 21st century, primarily due to two 
factors. The first was the appearance of global warming on the world stage, whilst the 
second factor was the realisation that fossil-fuel resources are depleting at an alarming 
rate.27 To illustrate, the sources of fossil-fuels which the UK found after the 1973 oil crisis 
are already nearing depletion. The negative effects of these developments are profound, 
since the UK changed from a net exporter of energy to a net importer in 2005.28  
                                                          
21 John Vogler, ‘Changing conceptions of climate and energy security in Europe’, in: Environmental Politics, 01 
July 2013, Vol.22(4), 629. 
22 Vogler, ‘Changing conceptions of climate and energy security in Europe’, 629. 
23 Ibidem, 613. 
24 Duffield, Fuels Paradise, 68. 
25 Ibidem, 153. 
26 Ibidem, 158. 
27 Ibidem, 67.  
28 Tomas Maltby, ‘European Union energy policy integration: A case of European Commission policy 
entrepreneurship and increasing supranationalism’, in: Energy policy, April 2013, Vol.55(100), 440. 
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For individual states, having access to secure sources of energy is of tremendous 
importance. Tomas Maltby has identified this phenomenon and concludes that European 
energy policies have mostly been shaped by the ability to securely import energy sources. 
Fossil-fuels can only be extracted from specific locations, resulting in a situation where many 
EU member-states have to import fossil-fuels from outside the EU. Russia, as an example, 
supplies substantial amounts of gas and oil to many EU member-states, predominantly in 
the Southeast of Europe.29 This poses a risk for energy security because many states are 
dependent on a single source for their energy imports. 
Maltby comes to the same conclusion as Vogler that, in the past, individual states valued 
freedom over a common policy regarding energy security. But he believes that, since the oil 
crisis and two gas-import disruptions in 2006 and 2009, states have been more willing to 
discuss a common policy to not only help strengthen Europe its position regarding Russia in 
negotiations, but to also create an international safeguard for when states have to deal with 
supply issues.30 This wish for a safeguard resulted in a European wide ‘Energy Security 
Strategy’, which was created and published in May 2014.31 Central to this strategy are short- 
and long-term solutions regarding energy security. The short-term solutions are mostly 
about crisis management, whereas the long-term solutions are about creating internal unity 
in negotiations to strengthen positions when dealing with external actors, working on- and 
completing an internal energy market and creating necessary infrastructure to be able to 
diversify sources.32 
The goal of diversification has a double meaning. It is not merely about identifying locations 
from which sources can be imported, but it is also about actively using several types of 
sources, such as renewable- and nuclear energy. Stimulating these developments is also a 
goal of the EU, and has been formulated in the 202033 and 2030 energy strategies, which 
stipulate energy-related goals for the coming 12 years.34 Targets of the 2030 energy strategy 
are a 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 levels, a share in 
consumption of at least 27% renewable energy, an improvement in energy efficiency of at 
least 27% and the completion of the internal energy market.35 Through these goals, the EU 
wishes to direct states towards the transition to renewable energy.  
Renewable energy therefore takes a central position in contemporary EU energy policies. A 
side-note in this matter is that the noble goals of protecting the environment should not be 
overstated. As long as security of supply is safe, Europe will push for goals which protect the 
environment, but when energy security is at risk these goals will be the first to be 
                                                          
29 Maltby, ‘European Union energy policy integration: A case of European Commission policy entrepreneurship 
and increasing supranationalism’, 435. 
30 Ibidem, 438. 
31 European Commission, ‘Energy Security Strategy’, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-
and-energy-union/energy-security-strategy (27 June 2018).  
32 Idem. 
33 European Commission, ‘2020 Energy Strategy’, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-
energy-union/2020-energy-strategy (27 June 2018).  
34 European Commission, ‘2030 Energy Strategy’, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-
energy-union/2030-energy-strategy (27 June 2018). 
35 Idem. 
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abandoned.36 The reason for this is simple: even though renewable energy is very valuable 
in its own right, it also has its limits and weaknesses. The goals of using renewables is very 
important but cannot be more important than risking the availability of affordable and 
accessible energy. This once again illustrates why the concept of energy security is relevant 
for answering the question regarding the impact of renewable energy on energy policy in 
Europe.  
Where in the past a common energy policy seemed far away, it can be said that in recent 
years the EU has made significant steps towards realising common grounds. In the past, 
several initiatives failed because states favoured the ability to choose their own energy 
policies over collective security, but it seems that recent developments such as climate 
change, an increase in dependency and a reduction in fossil-fuels reserves have watered 
down this argument enough for actual measures to be taken. Now that the EU has formed a 
clear Energy Strategy for the coming decades, it is time to analyse what kinds of energy can 
be used to achieve these goals.  
Chapter 2: Opportunities and Restrictions of Energy in 
the European Union 
With the strict directives made by the EU to reduce dependence on fossil-fuels, alternative 
sources of energy have to be found in the form of nuclear and renewable energy. Within 
these overarching terms, distinct types of energy can be found, each with its own 
opportunities and limitations. The goal of this chapter is to identify these characteristics, 
and to analyse the usefulness of these distinct types of energy in reaching the goals 
stipulated in EU Energy Strategies. Experimental types of energy such as tidal energy will not 
be analysed in this chapter because the choice has been made to focus on proven types of 
energy which can already be deployed across the EU. This is done to reduce uncertainty and 
speculation, and to keep this article rooted in contemporary observations. The forms of 
energy which will therefore be analysed are nuclear, bio, solar, wind and hydro energy. 
Nuclear Energy 
As stated in the introduction, nuclear energy is actually an overarching term instead of a 
specific type of energy. There are several types of reactors, several different forms of fuel 
and distinct approaches when it comes to energy generation, most notably through fission 
and fusion. All commercial reactors currently operate through fission, whilst fusion is an 
experimental form of nuclear generation which cannot be commercially used as of now.37An 
example of a fusion-reactor is the ITER project, which has the goal to create the largest 
                                                          
36 Malcolm C. Grimstom, The Paralysis in Energy Decision Making: European Energy Policy in Crisis, (Dunbeath 
2016) 10. 
37 Thomas Hamacher, Matthias Huber, Johannes Dorfner, Katrin Schaber and Alex M. Bradshaw, ‘Nuclear 
fusion and renewable energy forms: Are they compatible?’, in: Fusion Engineering and Design, October 2013, 
Vol.88(6-8), 657. 
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fusion-powered reactor in the world. However, it will probably take years before the results 
of this project can be translated into commercially viable reactors.38  
The reason why nuclear energy is relevant for the transition to renewable energy is because 
energy security plays a vital role in contemporary and near-future European- and national 
politics. Many forms of renewable energy have fluctuating power levels because of 
environmental impact, which has the potential to make them unreliable to use without a 
stable energy source operating next to them. Nuclear energy has the capability to be this 
‘stable anchor’, especially in states which have heavily invested in nuclear power plants 
(NPP’s) in the past.  
In France, nuclear energy currently provides 75% of the total amount of electrical energy, 
due to its long-standing policy on enhancing energy security through nuclear 
development.39 However, nuclear energy is not risk-free regarding security of supply. Raw 
materials such as uranium have to be imported. To counter this risk, France has diversified 
its importers, buying fuel from several states, including Canada, Niger, Australia, Kazakhstan 
and Russia.40 
Nuclear energy can therefore play a significant role in the EU its bid to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions whilst keeping energy security intact, because there are no greenhouse gasses 
emitted when generating nuclear electricity. Only mining and shipping of necessary fuels 
produces greenhouse gasses, but nuclear energy is still much cleaner than fossil-fuels.41  
That being said, it is still a highly controversial form of energy generation. Especially when 
related to another form of energy security, the safety involving energy generation, nuclear 
energy is often the focus of criticism. Chances are very low that something will go wrong, 
but when it does, the effects can be disastrous through nuclear explosions, meltdowns or 
radioactive fallout. There is also the issue that nuclear power generation creates waste 
which is difficult to handle and store, and which will remain radioactive for thousands of 
years. This has led to countless protests over the years, resulting in policymakers 
diminishing their support for nuclear energy. Even a state like France, which is the largest 
net-exporter of electricity in the world because of its reliance on nuclear energy, has 
introduced plans to reduce reliance from 75% to 50% in 2025.42 Therefore, even though 
nuclear energy definitely has the potential to help diversify sources, strengthen energy 
security and decrease emissions, it is unlikely that states which did not already invest in 
nuclear power will suddenly choose to do so in the future.  
 
                                                          
38 ITER, ‘What is ITER?’, https://www.iter.org/proj/inafewlines (28 June 2018).  
39 World Nuclear Association, ‘Nuclear Power in France, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-
library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france.aspx (08 June 2018). 
40 Idem. 
41 The Conversation, ‘Is nuclear power zero-emission? No, but it isn’t high-emission either’, (20 May 2015), 
http://theconversation.com/is-nuclear-power-zero-emission-no-but-it-isnt-high-emission-either-41615 (08 
June 2018). 
42 World Nuclear Association, ‘Nuclear Power in France, (June 2018), http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france.aspx (08 June 2018). 
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Bioenergy 
Bioenergy is the overarching term for biomass, biogas and biofuel, sources of renewable 
energy which rely on (processed) organic matter such as wood, plants or organic by-
products. Bioenergy is the most widely used form of renewable energy globally, providing 
roughly 10% of the global energy supply in 2016,43 whilst biomass alone accounted for 
roughly two-thirds of the total renewable energy consumption within the EU in 2012.44 The 
various forms of bioenergy make it a versatile resource. Its use is not merely limited to the 
generation of electricity but can also effectively assist in the sectors of transportation and 
heating as an alternative to electrification. Electrification is the increasing share of electricity 
in sectors in which its usage was limited in the past, such as electric cars in the 
transportation sector. Resource-generation itself is also versatile, ranging from small-scale 
gathering of by-products and organic waste to large scale bio-crop farms.45 This prominent 
level of applicability and versatility is the most significant beneficial characteristic of 
bioenergy, and the primary reason why it is already utilised on a large scale within the EU 
and the rest of the world.  
Another positive characteristic is the potential for storage. With contemporary technology 
regarding batteries it is impossible to store electricity on an industrial scale for longer 
durations of time, resulting in the fact that excess energy has to be curtailed.46 Bioenergy is 
a potential form of dispatchable energy, meaning that its supply can be adjusted based on 
demands.47 It can therefore act as a stabiliser next to the more fluctuating output of other 
forms of renewable energy.  
This does not mean that bioenergy is always suitable for storage. An issue with bioenergy is 
energy density, which is the amount of energy stored per unit volume. The energy density of 
bioenergy is dependent on the specific type, but generally tends to be much lower than any 
traditional form of fossil-fuel.48 This not only has implications for the ability to store 
bioenergy, but also for international trade and transportation. Therefore, bioenergy tends 
to be more effective the closer its resources are extracted to the place where it is 
generated, because transporting the same amount of bioenergy compared to fossil-fuels 
takes up more space.49  
The energy density of bioenergy also has implications for land usage, with large bio-crop 
farms or agroforestry potentially taking up space which could otherwise be used for other 
                                                          
43 World Energy Council, ‘World Energy Resources – Bioenergy – 2016’, https://www.worldenergy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/WEResources_Bioenergy_2016.pdf (28 June 2018), 2. 
44 European Commission, ‘Biomass’, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/biomass (08 
June 2018).  
45 World Energy Council, ‘World Energy Resources – Bioenergy – 2016’, https://www.worldenergy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/WEResources_Bioenergy_2016.pdf (28 June 2018), 2. 
46 Anjali Pandit, Alfred Holzwarth and Huub de Groot, Harnessing Solar Energy for the Production of Clean Fuel 
(Strasbourg, 2008), 2. 
47 World Energy Council, ‘World Energy Resources – Bioenergy – 2016’, https://www.worldenergy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/WEResources_Bioenergy_2016.pdf (28 June 2018), 21. 
48 Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, ‘Biomass Densification for Energy Production’, 
http://www.omafra.gov.on.ca/english/engineer/facts/11-035.htm#3 (28 June 2018). 
49 Idem. 
14 
 
purposes, such as food production or nature reserves. Whether this is actually the case is 
again dependent on the type of bioenergy, because many forms of bioenergy are by-
products of other industrial activities such as wood-production or agriculture, and thus do 
not necessarily claim land for themselves.50 Policymakers still need to be wary though that 
the negative effects of bioenergy on the environment remain as low as possible.  
Another issue is the fact that bioenergy is not greenhouse gas emission free. Resource-
production, shipping and energy/electricity generation all emit greenhouse gasses. These 
emissions are often considerably lower than fossil-fuels, but they are higher than other 
forms of renewable energy, which often do not emit greenhouse gas emissions at all once 
they start operating. 
Bioenergy is definitely an interesting option for the EU to pursue, most of all because of its 
versatility, potential in storage and room for technological advances. However, the fact that 
it is not emission-free and often lacking in energy-density are problems which need to be 
solved before it can truly be relied upon as a central pillar of energy production. Bioenergy is 
absolutely necessary for the coming decades, but the question remains whether it is truly 
preferable in the long run. 
Solar and Wind 
Wind and solar energy share the same analysis because their situation within European 
power generation is largely similar. Both sources have proven and experimental forms 
which can be used in energy generation. The most common types utilised in Europe are on 
shore wind energy and photovoltaic solar energy, with off shore wind energy and 
concentrated solar power as examples of more experimental or limited forms used in 
electricity generation. Both on shore wind energy and photovoltaic solar energy contributed 
26% and 11% to the total electricity production within the EU in 2015 respectively.51 
Difficulties with off shore wind energy are mostly because of geographical limitations, 
because it needs to be in open water, and because construction and operation is difficult. 
Concentrated solar power is currently only economically feasible in Southern Europe 
because it can only properly function in a location with access to a large amount of intense 
sun hours.52  
A strong benefit of both forms of energy, regardless of the way they are generated, is that 
they can be considered self-sustaining when the production process is finished. Solar panels 
and windmills do not require any resource which needs to be extracted and transported but 
instead rely on resources which can be accessed on the spot where they are constructed.  
This does not mean that both wind and solar energy are free of geographical limitations or 
international implications. Not all locations are equally suitable, with efficiency depending 
on several factors such as the amount of sun hours and the amount of obstructions which 
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diminish wind power. This also means that wind and solar energy are dependent on 
weather conditions as well, which results in a fluctuating power output. These fluctuations 
can result in energy shortages or excess energy, which are both problematic in their own 
way. The negative effects of energy shortages are obvious, but excess energy generated 
through these means cannot properly be stored, resulting in loss of energy and a reduction 
in efficiency.  
This fluctuating output, together with a phenomenon known as the decentralisation of 
electricity, poses challenges for the existing energy grids in Europe. In past decades, 
electricity would almost exclusively be generated in major power plants, with a clear 
distinction between supplier and consumer, resulting in rigid electricity grids with a 
distinguished origin and destination. Wind and solar energy can be constructed virtually 
anywhere on the grid, blurring this distinction. Fluctuating power levels amplify this effect, 
increasing the chance that consumers suddenly become suppliers. Older infrastructure 
cannot properly handle rerouting energy in that case, resulting in the need for a smart grid, 
which is capable of efficiently tracking and transferring energy, sending it to the places that 
need it the most.53 To make sure that interconnections between European member-states 
are able to cope with rerouting energy as well, the smart grid is not only a national concern, 
but will also have to transcend borders, connecting states in an efficient and cost-effective 
way.  
Wind- and solar energy are both crucial forms of renewable energy for reaching the 2030 
directives. They are already capable of deployment on an EU-wide scale, have few 
geographical limitations apart from efficiency related issues and are emission free. 
However, fluctuating power levels and decentralisation require significant investments in 
modern technology such as smart grids, whilst requiring other forms of energy to operate as 
a buffer to account for possible lower yields. It can be said with certainty that with 
contemporary technology, both types of renewable energy cannot operate without another 
form used to stabilise output.  
Hydropower 
Another form of renewable energy which can be considered ‘mature’ in the EU and which 
has been used for power generation since the late 19th century is hydropower.54  
Hydropower has accounted for approximately 14% of the total primary energy supply55 
(TPES) of renewable energy within the EU-28, with room for further expansion.56 
Hydropower has a strong beneficial characteristic which most other forms of renewable 
energy lack, which is its proven capability to store electricity. In 2016 approximately 99% of 
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the worlds stored electricity was in the form of hydropower.57 Reservoirs created by 
hydropower can act as an indirect electricity storage, through keeping water in reserve in 
times of abundance, and using reserves in times of need, making an electricity grid more 
capable of dealing with fluctuations.    
There are currently three traditional forms of hydropower. The first is the direct application 
of the currents of a river to create hydropower. The second is to create an artificial reservoir 
from which water can slowly be released. Both forms of hydropower have a net-gain of 
electricity. The third form of hydropower is called pumped-storage and involves pumping 
water from a lower reservoir back into a higher reservoir so that it can flow past the 
turbines again.58 This type of hydropower does not directly generate electricity but instead 
strengthens the capacity of hydropower to act as storage. Through utilising leftover 
electricity to pump water back into reservoirs again, it can still be ‘stored’ for later 
consumption, improving energy efficiency and reducing waste. 
Even though the benefits of hydropower are numerous, there are several negative 
characteristics which reduce its applicability in Europe. The first is its reliance on geography. 
Large-scale generation of hydropower is strongly dependent on the existence of suitable 
rivers and locations where reservoirs can be constructed without destroying social- and 
ecological structures.  
Besides these geographical limitations, hydropower also often has international 
implications. Water tends to be a cross-border resource, with 260 rivers crossing at least 
one national boundary.59 This international factor of hydropower has caused problems in 
other parts of the world, such as the Mekong river in Southeast-Asia, where Chinese 
projects in the upper river have negative implications for communities and ecosystems in 
other states downstream.60 Within the EU, most easily accessible hydropower projects have 
already been utilised, which leaves little room for expansion without damaging systems or 
creating international implications.  
Therefore, most of the potential in Europe does not lie with the larger, traditional form of 
hydropower generation, but instead in smaller generators which do not have significant 
implications for societies, ecosystems and international relations. Another opportunity lies 
in retrofitting older stations to increase energy production and efficiency.61 
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Hydropower will play a crucial role in reaching 2030 Energy Strategy goals, especially 
because of its characteristic to store electricity. However, its limited applicability reduces its 
potential in most states.  
Conclusion 
It seems that no contemporary form of renewable energy is infallible on its own. Emission 
free solutions such as wind, solar and hydro energy are dependent on geography and 
weather, which can result in limited room for deployment or fluctuating power levels. 
Nuclear energy, another form without greenhouse gas emissions,  
is expensive and does not enjoy widespread support because of potential risks involving 
generation. Bioenergy has a lot of versatility but is not emission-free and requires vast 
amounts of physical resources to function, all with varying levels of energy density. 
Diversification and cooperation are therefore necessary, and it seems a plausible hypothesis 
that the transition to renewable energy will bring European member-states closer together. 
Whether that is truly the case can be seen through the three case-studies of the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Bulgaria.  
Chapter 3 – Case One: the Netherlands 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a small Western-European state with approximately 17 
million citizens, bordering Germany to the East, Belgium to the South and the North Sea to 
the North-West. It also has one of the highest levels of population density in the world, with 
approximately 505 inhabitants per square kilometre.62 The Dutch have a strong and 
competitive economy63 and are well known for innovation in many areas dedicated to the 
environment, such as greenhouse agriculture.64  
Even though the position of the Netherlands seems strong to facilitate the transition to 
renewable energy, it is an underperformer when it comes to the deployment of renewable 
sources. In 2017 the Netherlands found themselves behind almost all other EU member-
states when it came to the total share of renewable energy in its energy-mix.65  The TPES of 
the Netherlands is dominated by fossil-fuels, with crude oil (57%), natural gas (26.7%) and 
coal (10.1%) having the largest share in 2015. The source of renewable energy with the most 
significant share, bioenergy, only follows with a share of 3.3%.66 When only the sources 
used for generating electricity are analysed, gas (42.3%) takes the lead, followed by coal 
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(38.7%) and wind energy (6.9%). This top-three is followed by bioenergy, (6%), oil (1.3%) 
and solar PV (1%).67  
A primary reason for this energy-mix is the geographical situation of the Netherlands. The 
primary defining geographical feature for the generation of energy is the availability of a 
domestic supply of natural gas. Not only within the province of Groningen, but also in 
smaller pockets in the North Sea.68 The availability of domestic natural gas has created a 
society and economy which is built on the premise that it can be extracted and used for 
generating electricity and heat in a relatively cheap manner. Until January 1, 2018, it was 
mandatory for new housing to be attached to the gas-network, resulting in almost all 
buildings having access to natural gas in some way or form.69  
Another reason why fossil-fuels have a significant share in Dutch TPES and electricity 
production is because nuclear energy never truly managed to win public support. Two NPP’s 
for commercial purposes have been constructed in total, at Dodewaard in 1965 and at 
Borssele, in 1973.70 The reactor at Dodewaard closed in 1997, whilst the Borssele reactor is 
still operating today. Dutch governments have shifted their position on the future of the 
Borssele reactor multiple times, switching between additional construction and total phase-
out. Given the fact that the Netherlands needs to catch up to reach EU Energy Strategy 
goals, the decision has been made not to phase-out the Borssele reactor in the near future. 
Instead, plans have been made for a new reactor to help assist in the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions, but this has not resulted in any construction so far.71 
Due to geographical limitations, hydropower is barely applicable in the Netherlands. The 
state is exceptionally flat, and a significant part of the Netherlands is located below water 
levels, making it impossible to construct large scale reservoirs. Larger rivers are also 
important shipping lanes, reducing their usefulness for large scale hydropower 
applications.72 Therefore, hydropower in the Netherlands is mostly limited to small- and 
medium-scale applications, resulting in a very small share in total electricity production of 
0.08%.73  
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Because of these factors, fossil-fuels continue to be of tremendous importance today. This 
dependency however, is coming to an end. Easily accessible deposits of fossil-fuels are 
rapidly depleting and vaults of natural gas in the Netherlands are no exception. Besides, the 
extraction of natural gas has resulted in air-pockets underground, which are responsible for 
earthquakes and subsidence, resulting in considerable damage in the northern province of 
Groningen. These factors, together with an increasing awareness of the negative 
environmental aspects of fossil-fuels and goals stipulated in the EU Energy Strategy 
directives, mean that the Dutch energy-mix has to undergo drastic changes in the near 
future.   
This no easy task, especially because the goals stipulated by the Dutch government itself can 
be called ambitious. In a speech to the European Parliament in June 2018, Dutch Prime 
Minister Mark Rutte stated that he wanted to push beyond the 40% reduction of 
greenhouse gasses and would instead aim for a 55% reduction.74 Given the current 
situation, it is clear that a lot has to change before the Netherlands can even come close to 
these numbers, which leaves the question whether it can be done at all. It is still too early to 
definitely answer this question, but an indication can be made based on the available plans 
presented by the Dutch government.  
A central document in which these plans have been made public is the Energieagenda of 
2016,75 which identifies a general approach regarding energy until 2050. In this document, 
three spearpoints are stipulated for innovation within the sector of electricity generation. 
The goals are to reduce CO2 emissions, work on cooperation in the (mostly) Northwest-
European energy market and make the current system of energy production more flexible.76  
There are several concrete measures which have been taken since then to further these 
goals. Not only is a connection to the gas-network no longer mandatory, but the goal is to 
stop connecting any new buildings and housing to the network after 2021. Gas production 
in Groningen will also be scaled-down the coming years and ultimately stopped, with similar 
plans for the off shore vaults.77 A downside is that these measures will almost certainly 
result in the Netherlands turning into a net importer of natural gas in a couple of years, 
because the reduction of production is quicker than the construction of alternatives.78  
At the same time, the Dutch government has also decided to close all five coal-powered 
plants before 2030. Domestic extraction of coal has been phased-out decades ago, but coal-
powered plants still operate on a supply of imported coal, often co-fired with biomass. 
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Whether or not these plants will continue after 2030 as full-biomass-plants is still under 
debate, but it is certain that coal-powered production will be phased-out.79 
Dutch decisions to close coal-powered plants and stop the extraction of domestic natural 
gas are ambitious but also difficult to achieve whilst maintaining energy security. Renewable 
sources not only have to take over the electricity production provided by fossil-fuels, but 
also the increasing energy demands generated through electrification in other sectors. It 
would be very difficult to achieve these goals whilst keeping electricity available and 
affordable. This has been recognised by the Dutch government, and as stated in the 
Energieagenda, the Netherlands therefore seeks active cooperation with its (mostly) 
Northwest-European neighbours in several fields.  
This emphasis on cooperation is not necessarily new, because a lot of cross-border 
connections are older than the recent directives made by the EU. As of today, the 
Netherlands has direct electric energy links with Norway, Belgium, the United Kingdom and 
Germany.80 The connection with Norway is called NordNed, a power cable between Norway 
and the Netherlands, which operates since 2008. This cable is a smart grid with the capacity 
to operate in both ways, depending on several factors such as demand and prices. In 
practice, the cable is mostly used during the day to transfer excess hydropower to the 
Netherlands. During night-time energy is often sent from the Netherlands to Norway. Norse 
hydropower plants tend to operate at lower capacities during night-time, and Dutch leftover 
energy can be used for pumped-storage.81 
A similar cable exists between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands since 2011 and is 
called BritNed. Just like NordNed, the cable can be used for both import and export of 
energy based on similar factors.82 The successes of these cables have paved the way for 
more interconnection, with concrete plans to create a similar cable with Denmark to link the 
Danish and Dutch wind-energy markets together.83 This cable will be called COBRAcable and 
will most likely be completed in 2019.84 A direct connection with Germany also exists. When 
gas prices are higher than the prices of coal, cheaper coal-powered energy is often imported 
from Germany for the time being. On sunny days, solar power also tends to be a cheaper 
alternative than gas resulting in solar energy being imported.85 
As illustrated, cooperation with neighbours through connecting electricity grids is not a new 
practice and is something the Netherlands has done for quite some time. Cooperation with 
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neighbours does not merely relate to the physical electricity grid, but also extends into 
other areas.  An example is the Political Declaration on Energy Cooperation between the 
North Seas Countries, which has been signed by Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.86 This declaration deals with a 
myriad of issues, but is mostly concerned with all facets of research, production and 
deployment of off shore wind energy. On shore wind energy is less than ideal in large parts 
of the Netherlands because resistance tends to be relatively high due to its high population 
density. Therefore, the Netherlands has invested heavily in the technology and construction 
of off shore wind platforms, such as the wind park in Borssele, which has a capacity of 
around 700MW.87 An issue which can potentially implicate these efforts is the fact that off 
shore wind energy can be deployed in international waters as well, and that therefore close 
cooperation with direct neighbours might be necessary. The North Seas countries 
recognised this issue, and therefore decided to actively cooperate in the planning and 
development of off shore wind and grid projects88 through new organisations such as the 
Offshore Wind Forum (IGF) and the North Seas Countries Offshore Grid Initiative (NSCOGI).  
Bioenergy is also a renewable source which benefits from international cooperation. Its 
versatility can be illustrated in the Dutch case, with bioenergy being used for electricity 
generation, heating, co-firing, transportation and more. Its significant role in renewable 
energy generation in the Netherlands is likely to expand in the near future, which creates 
opportunities and challenges alike. Problems with energy density and land-usage are 
amplified in the Netherlands because of the limited space which is available. There is 
currently still room for expansion,89 but the combination of a phase-out of fossil-fuels and 
an increase in energy/electricity demands will most likely make it a necessity to import 
bioenergy as well. To reduce the greenhouse gas emissions generated from shipping and to 
be able to have a say in quality and environmental protection, it would be beneficial to keep 
bioenergy trade largely within European borders. International cooperation in bioenergy 
therefore has two dimensions. The EU can create and enforce regulations regarding 
environmental impact and quality, and individual states can foster trade through bilateral 
and regional agreements. 
Concluding, the Netherlands can be characterised as an ambitious state in a difficult 
position. Reaching and surpassing EU Energy Strategy goals will require significant 
alterations in the functioning of Dutch society. The availability of fossil-fuels, especially gas, 
has kept electricity-prices constant, accessible and cheap, and the removal of gas as an 
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energy source will have significant effects on these pillars, especially because coal-powered 
electricity is also being phased-out. A potential solution to mitigate some of the issues which 
might arise from the phase-out of natural gas is importing gas from other parts of Europe, 
but the applicability of this solution is limited by differences in composition. Dutch natural 
gas has a relatively prominent level of nitrogen, which means that nitrogen needs to be 
added to foreign gas to make it compatible with the Dutch market. The facilities where this 
transition is possible are in that case the bottlenecks limiting the availability of natural gas, 
creating new infrastructure dilemmas for the Dutch to solve. 
To make matters even more difficult, nuclear energy is still quite controversial in the 
Netherlands and even though the chance exists that a new reactor will someday be 
constructed, it is clear that the Netherlands will, for the foreseeable future, not increase its 
dependency on electricity generated through nuclear means. This limits options for future 
large-scale energy generation to mostly bio, wind and solar energy. Whilst wind- and solar 
are very reliant on weather conditions, biomass emits CO2 and takes up valuable space for 
production.  
Therefore, cooperation is not just an option for the Dutch, it is the only way to even have a 
chance at reaching their goals of reducing their reliance on fossil-fuels. Hydropower is not 
an option in the Netherlands, but through importing it from Norway, the fluctuating power 
levels of solar- and wind-energy can be stabilised. Through Belgium, nuclear energy can be 
accessed for the same reasons as long as the reactors there are not decommissioned. 
Bioenergy can also only reach its potential in the Netherlands through cooperation. Through 
importing bioenergy from other European states, issues of supply can be overcome and 
generators can be kept running. The Dutch are also actively working together with 
neighbours when it comes to wind energy. Instead of focussing all their energy on 
constructing less-efficient windmills on land, the Netherlands is actively cooperating with 
neighbours to create more efficient technology, locate perfect locations for windfarms and 
create an interconnected system to support each other when security of supply is at risk.  
For the Dutch, accomplishing the transition towards renewable energy with contemporary 
technology is not akin to doing it alone, it is done through achieving goals together.  
Chapter 3 – Case Two: Sweden 
The Kingdom of Sweden is a Northern-European state with roughly 10 million citizens. It has 
direct borders with Finland, Norway and Denmark, whilst being separated from Estonia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Germany by the Baltic Sea. The historical context of electricity-
generation in Sweden has been characterised by a strong commitment to renewable 
sources combined with a significant reliance on nuclear power. Sweden is also a world-
leader in the field of bioenergy, especially in research regarding biofuels.90 fossil-fuels in 
Sweden barely contribute to electricity generation but still continue to play a key role in 
transportation and heating. This results in a significant difference between TPES and 
electricity generation. The three most important sources defining Sweden its TPES in 2016 
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are nuclear (34%), biofuel (24%) and oil (24%), whilst electricity generation is almost entirely 
dominated by hydro (40%), nuclear (40%) and wind (10%) energy.91 
These numbers can be used to draw several preliminary conclusions. The first conclusion is, 
even though Sweden has large shares of renewable sources in electricity production, 
nuclear energy still continues to be of tremendous importance. It also seems that, even 
though electricity production is almost fully free of emissions, other sectors still actively use 
fossil-fuels such as oil. In 2014, only 12% of the registered total vehicle fleet in Sweden could 
be called fossil-fuel free.92 To completely remove fossil-fuels from the TPES, Sweden still has 
a lot of work to do. 
Sweden has ambitious goals, but at the same time relies on another form of energy which 
can also be called controversial. Even though nuclear energy has brought significant benefits 
to Sweden through cheap and reliable electricity for consumers, questions regarding safety, 
waste-management and cost-effectiveness dominate a fractured Swedish political climate.93  
Before 1960, Sweden almost entirely relied on electricity generated through hydropower. 
The state is home to several larger rivers in the scarcely populated northern areas. These 
rivers, which had limited economic potential, could be used for the generation of 
hydropower instead. In turn, a system was created where larger hydropower plants would 
operate in the north, whilst being connected through electricity cables to the population 
centres in the south.94 However, during the late 1950’s it became increasingly more difficult 
to continue the construction of hydropower plants to satisfy energy needs. Most rivers had 
been utilised and concerns began to rise regarding the negative impact of hydropower on 
the environment. Sweden needed alternatives, and predictions about vastly increasing 
energy needs made the Swedish government believe that other options had to be pursued 
as well. Therefore, during the 1960’s, the decision was made to pursue the field of nuclear 
energy.95  
This decision had profound consequences, with nuclear power generation gradually 
increasing its share in the production of electricity until it became one of the main pillars, 
next to hydropower. Even though construction continued and NPP’s started to supply 
significant amounts of energy to Swedish society, several political parties would still openly 
question Sweden its reliance on nuclear energy, leading to a referendum in 1980 about its 
future in Sweden.  
After the referendum, the government decided that no further construction would be done 
on new NPP’s, and that all 12 plants would be closed before 2010 if realistic energy sources 
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existed by then to replace them. This marked the beginning of the phase-out period of 
Swedish nuclear policies.96  
Since then, several older reactors which were at the end of their life-span have been closed. 
Total phase-out of nuclear energy however, was constantly delayed until 2010, when the 
government decided that nuclear energy would remain as a power source next to 
renewable energy for the foreseeable future. Construction of NPP’s on new locations would 
still be embargoed, but when existing reactors would reach the end of their operational life-
span, the government allowed the replacement of these reactors with newer models.97 
These measures were a confirmation of the existing status quo. At the same time, the 
Swedish government did once again stress that it aims to increase the importance of 
renewable energy in power generation, with a specific focus on wind energy.98 Therefore, 
even though nuclear energy will remain part of Swedish power generation, its total share 
will gradually decrease. The decision to revert the phase-out policy of nuclear energy is 
understandable. Nuclear energy is capable of providing a level of security which cannot 
currently be reached by renewable energy. With the current energy-mix, Sweden already 
turns into an energy importer when hydropower yields are low.99 Therefore, it seems 
unwise to get rid of nuclear energy until another stable source of energy is ready to take 
over the role of an ‘anchor’ for other fluctuating sources.  
Besides, completely relying on renewables would lead to a situation where a large amount 
of excess energy has to be generated. As stated, batteries are currently incapable of storing 
energy on larger scale, meaning that electricity cannot be stored in times of high production 
to be used in times when production is lower. A potential solution would be to export this 
excess energy to other European states but given the fact that these are also investing in 
renewables, specifically wind- and solar energy, and thus potentially have to face the same 
problems and overproduction, application of this solution is limited.100 It can therefore be 
argued that it would be better, not only for Swedish energy security, but also for the energy 
security of neighbouring states and the EU as a whole, that Swedish reactors will keep 
operating for the foreseeable future.  
Sweden has been at the forefront of cooperation and interconnection with neighbours for 
decades. In 1996, a Norwegian-Swedish power exchange was created and the joint trading 
exchange Nord Pool ASA was established. Finland joined in 1998, with Western Denmark in 
1999 and Eastern Denmark in 2000. Since then, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, the United 
Kingdom and Germany have also formally joined.101  
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This power exchange, which will be called Nord Pool from now on, is a market which 
operates on a day-ahead basis. Each day, suppliers and consumers of energy can place ‘bids’ 
on each individual hour the following day. When all bids are placed, an equilibrium is 
created in all individual bidding areas. The prices are calculated and published afterwards, 
and energy is sent in the right direction. Bidding areas can be entire states, such as the 
individual Baltic states, or portions of a single state, such as East- and West Denmark. This 
system has been created to ensure that the market considers existing local infrastructure 
and prices.102 
Nord pool is a regional international energy market which can be used by suppliers and 
consumers to strengthen security and lower prices. Consumers can search the market for 
cheap energy, whilst suppliers can sell excess energy to consumers in other states, 
increasing profits and energy efficiency. This market could not exist if infrastructure was 
lacking. Sweden has recognised this responsibility, and together with their Nordic 
neighbours, invested heavily into improvements and connections.  
The EU 2030 goals call for electricity interconnection targets. In 2020, each European state 
needs to be able to send at least 10% of their produced electrical-energy towards 
neighbouring countries through electricity cables.103 The Northern-European states, through 
their investments in setting up Nord pool and other bilateral projects such as NordNed, are 
well underway to reach or surpass these targets.  
Investments in infrastructure continue to expand. In the past, the Baltic states were unable 
to directly trade electricity with the rest of the EU due to a lack of infrastructure. To solve 
this issue, the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan Initiative (BEMIP) was agreed upon 
in June 2009 with the major goal of eliminating the existing electrical isolation of the Baltic 
states.104 This initiative resulted in, amongst other things, the Nordbalt and Litpol links. 
Litpol is an electrical cable of 500MW between Lithuania and Poland, and Nordbalt is a 
700MW electrical cable between Sweden and Lithuania.105 The Nordbalt cable is in 
operation since 2016 and delivers electricity through the Nord Pool market.  
The improvements in electricity infrastructure are beneficial for the Swedes as well. As the 
Dutch example illustrated, interconnections with neighbours allows states to play to their 
strengths. The Swedes have a high reliance on nuclear energy and hydropower. Nuclear 
energy can be considered stable, but hydropower is dependent on seasons and weather. 
Through linking and strengthening its electrical network with other states, such as Denmark, 
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which invests heavily in wind- and thermal energy,106 Sweden can export excess energy in 
times of abundance and import energy in times of need. Linking the Baltic states to the 
European continental grid and strengthening this connection also reduces their dependence 
on Russia, which strengthens energy security and stability in the region.  
Other regional initiatives besides concrete infrastructure proposals and energy markets are 
also part of international cooperation. The Nordic ministers of energy regularly meet to 
discuss new proposals and ideas. One such meetings took place in May 2018, in which 
primary topics were deepening cooperation in the electricity market, research and 
deployment of renewable energy and energy efficiency.107 The result of this specific meeting 
was a joint declaration in which all Nordic countries want to push businesses and 
organisations to submit concrete proposals to strengthen exports of technology.108 All three 
states, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, are forerunners when it comes to technology of 
renewable energy, with Sweden having strong expertise in wind, ethanol (biofuel) and 
hydro,109 Norway with wind and hydro,110 and Denmark with wind, thermal and solar.111 
Exporting these technologies can help a long way in assisting other Europeans states 
reaching targets as well.  
In conclusion, the Swedes are, together with the other Nordic states of Denmark and 
Norway, forerunners when it comes to renewable energy, and are all functioning examples 
of how a reduced dependence on fossil-fuels can function in practice. Besides, the Nordic 
states are also a real-life illustration of how liberalised day-ahead markets can function in an 
international setting. Through cooperation, energy-mixes are strengthened, resulting in 
benefits in energy security for all states involved. The Nord Pool market is currently home to 
all forms of nuclear and renewable energy described so far, allowing for flexibility and 
diversification, whilst improving energy efficiency and allowing consumers to identify the 
best prices.   
Increasing the total area covered by this market will only emphasise this concept of strength 
in numbers and will assist in strengthening energy security even more. It therefore does not 
come as a surprise that besides other energy markets based on the template of Nord Pool 
are also being created throughout Europe. In the end, through interconnection, the idea is 
that all these markets will be joined together in a single liberalised European market. Nord 
Pool serves as a functioning example that, to secure supply and prices in energy-mixes 
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dominated by renewable energy, this goal is possible and beneficial for everyone 
involved.112 
Chapter 3 – Case Three: Bulgaria 
The Republic of Bulgaria is located in Southeast-Europe with a population of 7 million 
inhabitants. Situated on the periphery of Europe, Bulgaria shares borders with EU-member 
states Romania and Greece to the north and south respectively. Serbia, Macedonia and 
Turkey also border Bulgaria in the north, west and south. Bulgaria is a relatively new 
addition to the EU, having formally joined on 1 January 2007. It is not a member of the 
Schengen Area and is also not part of the Eurozone, though the prospect exists that Bulgaria 
will become a full-fledged member of both groups in the coming years.113  
The TPES of Bulgaria is dominated by fossil-fuels. In 2015, crude oil (36%) and coal (35%) are 
the sources with the largest share in TPES, followed by nuclear energy (21%) and natural gas 
(14%).114 Even though crude oil and natural gas both have a significant impact on the TPES 
of Bulgaria, there is almost no domestic production of both. They are instead almost entirely 
imported from one supplier, which is the Russian Federation.115 There is a noticeable 
difference between the TPES of Bulgaria and the sources which are used for the production 
of electricity. The most important sources of electricity production in Bulgaria are coal 
(45%), nuclear (31%) and hydro (12%), which are followed by natural gas (3.7%), wind (2.9%) 
and solar energy (2.8%).116   
The energy-market in Bulgaria is under control of a relatively small group of influential 
power-companies. In 2012, the energy-market was controlled for 92% by 8 out of a total of 
24 businesses. Besides the lack of choice for consumers, switching between power-
companies is almost non-existent because energy-prices in Bulgaria are still heavily 
regulated.117  
Not only the energy-market is controlled by a small amount of companies. The same 
situation can be witnessed on the production-side, with the Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD 
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(BEH) and its subsidiary NEK controlling 45% of the total installed capacity of production in 
Bulgaria.118 
The Bulgarian government is currently trying to remedy this situation through several 
reforms. In 2012, one-third of the electricity-market in Bulgaria was opened up, allowing 
consumers to choose their own suppliers of electricity.119 Another example is the 
Independent Bulgarian Energy Exchange (IBEX). IBEX is a day-ahead market which was 
originally established in January 2014. This market was at first completely under the control 
of the BEH, which led to suspicions of abuse of power, given their substantial role in both 
the production process and open market. These suspicions resulted in the sale of IBEX to the 
Bulgarian Stock Exchange in August 2017, which is directly owned by the government 
instead.120 
Another defining aspect of Bulgaria is that it is currently a net-exporter of electricity. The 
availability of nuclear energy, hydropower and coal have created a situation where the 
Bulgarians tend to produce more than they need, with net-exports reaching 20.4% in 
2012.121 The state is still very reliant on imported fossil-fuels such as oil and gas, but these 
are barely used in the production of electricity, with gas having a share of 4.1% in 2012 and 
oil only reaching 0.3%.122 The shares of renewable energy are increasing, but because of the 
fact that no existing coal- or nuclear powered plants are being shut down, the Bulgarians 
still continue to be an important exporter of electricity in the Southeast-European region. 
Just as Sweden, Bulgaria has a long history with nuclear power, with the first reactor 
beginning operations in 1974. At the Kozluduy plant, the Bulgarian government started 
construction in what would eventually result in six reactors. When Bulgaria applied for an 
EU-membership, the discussion was raised whether the older reactors would remain 
operational. Reactors 1 and 2 already closed in 2002, but numbers 3 and 4 were still active 
at that time. In the end, the decision was made to close them as well, even though the 
opportunity also existed to upgrade them. Only reactors 5 and 6 remain operational 
today.123 
Since then, there have been several proposals for other projects, both at the Kozluduy plant 
and on a new location, which has come to be known as the Belene NPP. The site has been 
the host of several projects, which so far have all been cancelled due to a lack of funds. In 
the 1980’s construction started on two reactors which were partially built until they were 
aborted in 1991.124 After that, the site remained vacant until construction was officially 
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restarted in 2008. Due to a lack of investors, construction was once again frozen in 2010, 
with the project being officially abandoned in March 2012. The two reactors are still 
unfinished as of today.  
In recent years, with the growing impact of renewable energy on Bulgarian energy- and 
electricity production, the government is once again identifying the possibility of continuing 
construction at the Belene site. A primary reason cited for this decision is the fact that the 
Belene NPP can assist in reaching 2030-EU goals regarding pollution and emissions. So far, 
this has not resulted in any actual construction being done.125 
The Bulgarian government is also working on increasing the share of renewable energy. 
These efforts have had some success, especially in the field of electricity, but there are still 
challenges which need to be overcome. Electricity production in Bulgaria is currently reliant 
on the availability of lignite, a form of coal which is especially polluting when used in 
electricity production.126 In reaching emission goals of the EU, it would be preferable if these 
plants could be shut down, but they do possess the positive trait of being very stable in their 
electricity output. The same cannot be said for most forms of renewable energy. Renewable 
energy also tends to be more expensive to produce, increasing electricity prices and 
production costs in a state which is already economically weaker than most other EU 
member-states. This effectively means that Bulgaria needs the assistance of investors, which 
is an arduous process for several reasons.127 One of these reasons is that most investors are 
foreign, which can result in potential unwanted implications for Bulgarian sovereignty over 
their energy-production. Another problem is the fact that many investors ultimately back 
down or turn out to lack necessary funds, making it a challenge to find suitable investors at 
all.128 
Another issue is that the Bulgarian economy and society are amongst the most energy-
intensive in the EU, which is a situation which has to be addressed because improving 
energy efficiency is one of the 2020 goals stipulated by the EU. Especially in the fields of 
heating and cooling, the Bulgarian government has the opportunity to work on more 
efficient ways of generation and transmission.129 However, the same issue of costs is also 
relevant here, limiting the capacity of the Bulgarian government to act on its own.  
The last challenge is, even though investors have expressed support for large wind- and 
solar farms, the Bulgarian power grid is sometimes unable to harness the power generated 
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from these farms.130 Solar- and wind energy both contribute to a decentralisation of 
electricity. To cope with these changes a smart grid is necessary which can send electricity 
in the right direction whilst operating as efficient as possible, but such a grid is costly and 
difficult to construct, once again requiring the Bulgarian government to search for foreign 
investors.131 
The deployment of renewable energy in Bulgaria is therefore hampered by the fact that 
three issues need to be solved at the same time with limited funds. That being said, these 
issues can at least partially be solved through investments in infrastructure.  
Infrastructure does not only have a national aspect, but an international one as well, and as 
illustrated in the cases of the Netherlands and Sweden, security of supply can be guaranteed 
through working together with other states. The Bulgarian government has recognised this 
opportunity and has invested in several projects so far. The efforts of the Bulgarian 
government in infrastructure are not merely because EU-2020 goals stipulate that a 10% 
electricity capacity interconnectivity needs to be achieved,132 but also because Bulgaria and 
the rest of the Southeast-European states often only have access to one supplier of gas and 
oil.  The fact that Bulgaria and its neighbours can only access natural gas through Russia 
leaves the state at a political disadvantage and poses a serious threat to security of supply. 
Some of the states involved are not (yet) part of the EU, but this common predicament has 
created a situation in which non-EU member-states and EU member-states cooperate to 
improve energy security in several ways.   
The first form of cooperation is the Energy Community, which is an international 
organisation founded in 2005 with the goal of creating a pan-European energy market which 
also includes relevant neighbouring states as contracting parties or observers. The current 
contracting parties are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine. Armenia, 
Norway and Turkey are observers.133 Bulgaria itself is currently an EU-participant but 
assisted in founding the Energy Community back in 2005 as a contracting party, because the 
state had not joined the EU back then. Even though contracting parties of the Energy Union 
obviously are not directly bound by EU-goals and directives, they are still considered 
essential in making sure surrounding EU member-states are capable of reaching stipulated 
goals. Especially in the Balkan, where many states have not yet fully joined the EU, it would 
be a tremendous benefit if energy and electricity could also flow through these states 
instead of the connection Romania-Bulgaria-Greece.  
A direct example of cooperation between EU member-states and Energy Community 
contracting parties is the European Commission Initiative on Central Eastern and South-
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Eastern European Gas Connectivity, also known as CESEC. This initiative was launched in 
2015 by nine Middle- and Southeast EU member-states, including Bulgaria, and was later 
joined by eight Energy Community contracting parties. A direct goal of CESEC is to make 
sure that all states in the region have access to at least three diverse sources of gas, which 
means that infrastructure in the region needs to be constructed and strengthened.134 
Because of several successes in the field of natural gas, the original scope of CESEC has been 
expanded to other areas as well. Since 2016, CESEC also assists its member-states with the 
construction of infrastructure in electricity and energy efficiency. The primary reason for 
this expansion in scope is that CESEC believes that the key to security of supply is a 
comprehensive energy strategy, dealing with the total energy-mixes of all states involved.135 
These initiatives illustrate how the energy situation of a state is bound by its specific 
situation and geographical location. Southeast-European states barely produce natural gas 
themselves but still rely on the resource for heating and electricity. Given the fact that 
Russia is often the only supplier because of infrastructure limitations creates a risk in their 
security of supply which has to be amended as soon as possible. In Northwest-Europe, an 
increase in interconnection is done to keep energy security stable in the future, whilst in 
Southeast-Europe interconnection is necessary to amend risks to energy security which are 
relevant right now.    
Examples of fossil-fuel infrastructure in the region which directly involve Bulgaria are the 
IGB project, a gas-interconnector between Greece and Bulgaria,136 and the Transgaz-BRUA 
Gas Interconnection Project between Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria, which is 
partially funded by the European Investment Bank.137 It serves as a reminder that, even 
though the EU vouched to reduce, and eventually remove, its dependency on fossil-fuels, 
investments still have to be made to secure supplies whilst natural gas is still critical for 
energy security.  
That being said, there are also investments in electrical infrastructure. National smart grids 
to accommodate an increased reliance on renewable sources are one example, but 
interconnection with other states is also a priority for the Bulgarian government. An 
example is the wish of both Bulgaria and Macedonia to look at the opportunities provided 
by the integration of their respective energy markets under non-discrimatory and fair 
conditions. This project is only supported by a memorandum so far but provides an 
interesting pilot on the integration of energy markets between an EU member-state and an 
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Energy Community contracting party.138 This is important to note because, even though EU-
directives regarding renewable energy deal with internal EU situations, it would be 
strategically valuable if the energy market could be extended to Energy Community 
contracting parties and other strategically located states.  
To conclude, the state of Bulgaria is in a very interesting situation regarding its energy 
policies for several reasons. First of all, because of its economic situation and historical 
context. Its market functions differently than Northwest-European states and still needs to 
make several significant steps before it is truly liberalised. The Bulgarian government also 
needs to address several critical issues to reach EU-goals but lacks the funds to achieve 
these without (foreign) investments. Security of supply is also at stake in Bulgaria, with a 
critical reliance on Russia for the supply of gas and oil, leaving the state vulnerable to 
disruptions in times of political turmoil. It is also located at the periphery of the EU, being 
the only route on land for energy infrastructure towards Greece, whilst at the same time 
fulfilling a vital role as a gateway to Energy Community contracting parties and observers 
such as Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey.  
Bulgaria illustrates how fossil-fuels remain critical to the energy-systems of the EU as well, 
and that terms as diversity, scarcity and interconnection are not merely relevant for 
renewable energy, but applicable to fossil-fuels too. Diversity within suppliers of a specific 
source of energy is just as critical as diversity in sources for maintaining energy security.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, to answer the central question of this article how the transition to renewable 
sources for the generation of electricity influences European integration, it is apparent that 
the distinct characteristics of renewable sources of energy have facilitated change. In the 
past, common European policies and a single energy market were often met with scepticism 
because less-impeding alternatives existed. Limited success was met with the regulations 
regarding coal in the ECSC, but other forms of fossil-fuel never managed to reach the same 
levels of regulation. Even when security of supply was at a severe risk, such as during the oil 
crisis of 1973, a common policy could not be agreed upon. Instead, states settled for 
individual options, identifying deposits, changing energy-mixes or securing bilateral 
agreements with third parties. These solutions were possible because of the fundamental 
characteristics of fossil-fuel. As long as supplies could be secured through bilateral 
agreements or direct access, there was no need for further international cooperation. Only 
whenever bilateral or regional solutions did not suffice, European cooperation was 
identified as an alternative.  
A contemporary example where European cooperation is necessary for the security of 
supply regarding fossil-fuels is the case of Southeast-Europe and Bulgaria. Gas cannot easily 
be imported without pipelines and other relevant infrastructure, so diversification in 
                                                          
138 Ministry of Energy, ‘Bulgaria and Macedonia have taken an important step towards coupling “day-ahead” 
electricity markets’, (18 May 2018), https://www.me.government.bg/en/news/bulgaria-and-macedonia-have-
taken-an-important-step-towards-coupling-day-ahead-electricity-markets-2598.html?p=eyJ0eXBlIjoiaG90In0= 
(27 June 2018).  
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suppliers of natural gas can only be achieved through regional- and European cooperation. 
Bulgaria therefore illustrates that European cooperation to secure fossil-fuels is not unheard 
of, but that it remains important to understand that there are multiple levels of solving 
fossil-fuel supply issues, out of which European cooperation is considered a last resort.  
This system is gradually coming to an end because of the impact of renewable sources of 
electricity generation, which fundamentally differ from fossil-fuels. Instead of having to 
locate and extract deposits which need to be shipped to power plants, sources of renewable 
energy are dependent on weather, climate and geography. Except for bioenergy, there is 
also no physical resource which needs to be shipped; the electricity is generated on the site 
of the resource itself. This effectively means that trade will often not be in physical 
resources, but in electricity itself instead, resulting in the necessity of an interconnected 
grid. Besides, even when ideal conditions have been identified, renewable sources are still 
not entirely stable in electricity output, because weather- and climate-patterns cannot be 
controlled.  
This combination of fluctuating output and natural prerequisites has a negative impact on 
energy security, because it adds an additional dimension of uncertainty whilst limiting 
available options. This is where the case-study of the Netherlands is a fitting illustration. The 
Netherlands has a long history of stable, accessible and affordable electricity through 
domestic supplies of natural gas. Hydropower and nuclear energy are currently no viable 
options, resulting in the only currently applicable alternatives being solar, wind and bio 
energy. This effectively means that there are no ‘stable anchors’ in the Netherlands itself, 
leaving electricity production in the state largely at the mercy of fluctuating output 
generated by solar and wind energy. In this case, European cooperation is the only solution 
to safeguard security of supply when reliance on available forms of renewable energy 
increases. Through interconnection with neighbours, the Netherlands can reliably access 
hydropower and nuclear electricity without actually constructing these types of electricity 
generators on its own territory.  
The Netherlands is currently increasing its interconnection with its (North-western) 
neighbours, and is therefore gradually becoming a part of European energy markets such as 
Nord Pool, which is an already functioning example of European cooperation determined by 
renewable electricity. Even states which do not necessarily have to resort to importing 
energy benefit in a similar system. In an isolated system, excess energy would be curtailed 
because of a lack of storage capacities. Through international markets such as Nord Pool, 
consumers in other states can be found instead, increasing profits and energy efficiency. 
International energy markets also incentivise individual states to play to their strengths. 
Diversification should therefore no longer merely be seen in a national context, but 
becomes an international affair as well. Additional connected members amplify benefits, 
especially when the market outgrows weather-patterns or climate-types and grows to 
incorporate as many distinct sources of renewable energy as possible.  
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In short, the fundamental difference between a reliance on fossil-fuels and a reliance on 
renewable sources is that in the case of fossil-fuels European cooperation is a choice 
amongst many, but in the case of renewable sources European cooperation is a necessary 
solution to retain secure supplies. If the EU truly wishes to ultimately remove any kind of 
reliance on fossil-fuels in electricity generation in the coming decades, it needs to finish the 
internal energy market and perhaps even add non-European states in the future as well, 
such as the Energy Community contracting parties. This means that plenty of work to 
improve interconnectivity remains to be done. Luckily for the EU, it seems that these goals 
can count on support from individual member-states, as everywhere throughout Europe 
ambitious projects to strengthen grid connections are being carried out.  
It seems that Mark Rutte his decision to identify climate policies as a crucial topic for the EU 
was the right one to make. If Europe truly wants to be an example for the rest of the world 
in sustainable development, it cannot be done without international cooperation. A Union 
built upon renewable sources for electricity production will therefore be the functioning 
example of its own motto: it will truly be “United in Diversity.”139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
139 Europa.eu, ‘The EU motto’, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/motto_en (03 July 2018). 
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List of Abbreviations  
Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD     BEH 
Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan Initiative   BEMIP 
Central Eastern and South-Eastern European Gas Connectivity  CESEC 
European Union       EU 
European Coal and Steel Community     ECSC 
European Communities      EC 
Independent Bulgarian Energy Exchange    IBEX 
North Seas Countries Offshore Grid Initiative    NSCOGI 
Nuclear Power Plant       NPP 
Offshore Wind Forum       IGF 
Total Primary Energy Supply      TPES 
United Kingdom       UK 
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